

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 032149

NODIS
FOR BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT CAPE TOWN 221 ACTION SECSTATE
INFO DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS LONDON LILONGWE
LUSAKA MAPUTO USUN FEB 7

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L CAPE TOWN 221

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PDEV, RH
SUBJECT: RHODESIA: POSSIBLE INTERNAL AGREEMENT

REF: (A) STATE 029698, (B) GABORONE 0261, (C) GABORONE 0299

FOLLOWING ARE OUR VIEWS ON THE QUESTIONS YOU RAISED IN REF (A):
SAG JUDGMENT

1. DURING HIS MEETING WITH LORD CARVER LAST MONTH, PIK BOTHA
SAID THE CHANCES WERE 50-50 THAT AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE
REACHED IN SALISBURY. WE SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THE SAG BELIEVES
THE ODDS FOR SUCCESS ARE MUCH HIGHER, ESPECIALLY IF US AND UK DO
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NOT TRY TO DISRUPT IT.

HOW EVENTS WOULD UNFOLD
2. AS SUGGESTED BY GOPO'S CONVERSATION WITH EMBASSY
GABORONE (GABORONE 0261), SMITH, SITHOLE AND CHIRAU (AND
POSSIBLY MUZOREWA) ENVISION THAT ONCE AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE
IS REACHED IN THE SALISBURY TALKS, THE PARTICIPANTS WILL
ESTABLISH A TRANSITIONAL OR INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION. THE STRUCTURE OF THIS GOVERNMENT WE DO NOT KNOW.
ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO HAVE A RULING JUNTA OF SEEMINGLY

EQUAL PARTNERS, WITH A ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIP BUT WITH SMITH FIRMLY IN CONTROL THROUGH RETENTION OF WHITES IN THE IMPORTANT MINISTRIES. WHETHER THE BLACK LEADERS WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY OVER VARIOUS PORTFOLIOS IS UNCERTAIN. MY GUESS IS THAT THEY WILL NOT, AND THAT THE INTERIM LEADERSHIP WILL DEVOTE ITSELF TO THE VARIOUS TASKS ANNUNCIATED IN PARA 8 OF REFTEL C, INCLUDING DRAFTING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

3. THUS, IN EFFECT, THE THREE BLACK NATIONALISTS WILL JOIN SMITH'S GOVERNMENT WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF WINDOW DRESSING. WE DO NOT KNOW MUZOREWA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SUCH A PLAN. HE WILL VERY LIKELY SEEK MORE BLACK INVOLVEMENT AND DIRECTION. BUT HE MAY BE PERSUADED THAT IT IS ONLY AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT LEADING TO WHAT HE SEEKS. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WOULD OF COURSE REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF BRINGING THE INTERNAL NATIONALISTS BACK ONTO THE INTERNATIONAL COURSE.

4. THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WOULD APPARENTLY PROCEED WITH DRAFTING AND PROMULGATION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION WITHIN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CURRENT CHARTER. THE RHODESIAN PARLIAMENT AND "THE PRESENT ELECTORATE" WOULD BE ASKED TO APPROVE THE DOCUMENT. DESPITE GOBO'S STATEMENT TO THE CONTRARY (REF A, PARA 5), NO REFERENDUM IS APPARENTLY TO BE HELD AMONG THE BULK OF BLACK VOTERS. CONFIDENTIAL

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THIS IS IN FACT MADE CLEAR IN THE DOCUMENTS GOPO PROVIDED (REFTEL B, PARA. 8).

5. SMITH HAS TALKED OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION BY MARCH. GOPO SAID IT WOULD BE 6-12 MONTHS AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS (REFTEL A, PARA. 5), WHICH IS PROBABLY A MORE REALISTIC TIME-FRAME.

6. DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, WHICH COULD EASILY EXTEND TO THE END OF THE YEAR, THE PRESENT STRUCTURE AND COMMAND OF THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES WOULD VERY LIKELY CONTINUE WITH LITTLE SIGNIFICANT CHANGE.

SAG POSITION

7. THE SAG WISHES TO RIVE THE APPEARANCE OF DOING NOTHING TO PREJUDICE THE SEARCH FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON RHODESIA. AT THE SAME TIME IT IS CLEAR FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTHA AND FOURIE LAST MONTH THAT THEY SERIOUSLY DOUBT WHETHER THIS IS ACHIEVABLE. BECAUSE OF THE DOUBTFUL PROSPECT AND THE MORE TOLERANT ATTITUDE WHICH A GOVERNMENT ARISING FROM AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IS EXPECTED TO HAVE TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA, THE SAG WILL HOPE THAT AN INTERNAL AGREEMENT WILL SUCCEED.

8. THE SAG RECOGNIZES THE DANGERS OF ESCALATING WARFARE WITH GREATER SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT INHERENT IN THIS COURSE. IT IS ALSO FULLY AWARE OF THE RISKS OF NEW UN SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, INCLUDING POSSIBLY AN OIL EMBARGO. NEVERTHELESS,

THEY SEEM TO CALCULATE THAT THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS INHERENT IN AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA WOULD BE MITIGATED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS: (A) THE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS-- ESPECIALLY THE FAILURE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ACCEPT THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN; (B) DISUNITY WITHIN THE LIBERATION FORCES; (C) SMITH'S ACCEPTANCE OF ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE ELECTIONS; (D) THE MAJORITY RULE, BLACK-LED GOVERNMENT THAT WILL EVENTUALLY EMERGE IN SALISBURY; AND (E) THE LIKELY ABILITY OF THIS GOVERNMENT, WITH SAG MATERIAL ASSISTANCE, TO
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CONTAIN FOR SOME TIME THE MILITARY THREATS POSED BY THE LIBERATION FORCES.

9. PRETORIA AND SALISBURY SEEM TO BE GAMBLING THAT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, MOST WESTERN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE UK WOULD NOT BE WILLING OR ABLE POLITICALLY OR ECONOMICALLY TO JUSTIFY A POLICY OF BRINGING DOWN THE NEW INTERIM MULTIRACIAL REGIME, MUCH LESS THE NEW BLACK-LED ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT THAT WILL EVENTUALLY EMERGE. THEY PROBABLY EXPECT THE US WILL DEPLORE THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AND PERHAPS ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT IT TO WIN FL AND PF ACCEPTANCE OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN. YET, THEY SEEM TO THINK THAT WITH LACK OF WESTERN COHESION ON SANCTIONS, THE US GOVERNMENT WILL FIND IT MOST DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT NEW SANCTIONS. THEY ALSO EVIDENTLY CALCULATE THAT THE OAU WILL SOON SPLIT OVER THE ISSUE, AND MODERATE AND CONSERVATIVE COUNTRIES IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE WILL EVENTUALLY EXTEND RECOGNITION. IN ADDITION, VORSTER FORESEES THE POSSIBILITY THAT REALIZATION OF AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT MAY SPLINTER THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WITH NKOMO AND POSSIBLY ELEMENTS OF ZANU ATTEMPTING TO GET INTO THE PICTURE. HE CALCULATES, PROBABLY CORRECTLY, THAT IF THIS SHOULD HAPPEN, OPPOSITION TO THE SETTLEMENT WOULD COLLAPSE.

THE OPTIONS

10. IN ADDRESSING THE OPTIONS WE NEED TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AT THIS STAGE IS NOT AN INHERENTLY STABLE ARRANGEMENT. AS REFLECTED IN THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY IN THE SALISBURY TALKS OVER VOTER ROLLS, MUZOREWA IS STILL A RELUCTANT AND UNCERTAIN PARTNER WITHOUT WHOSE COOPERATION THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE AND INTERIM GOVERNMENT WILL LOSE ALL CREDIBILITY. THERE IS THE CLEAR POSSIBILITY--ASSUMING THAT AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE IS REACHED--THAT MUZOREWA WOULD BOLT IF SMITH, WORKING WITH CHIRAU AND SITHOLE, TRIED TO SMOTHER HIM IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION.
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11. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE THREE GENERAL OPTIONS OPEN TO US IN THE EVENT THERE IS AGREEMENT IN SALISBURY ON AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.
OPTION 1: STRONG REACTION WITH SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS AND VIGOROUS

PURSUIT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN. UNDER THIS OPTION WE WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE THE MOVE IN SALISBURY; VOTE FOR CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTIONS IN THE UN, INCLUDING CALLS FOR NON-RECOGNITION; APPLY PRESSURE ON THE SAG TO FORCE SALISBURY TO ABANDON ITS PLANS; PREPARE TO SUPPORT AN ESCALATING SERIES OF UNSC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SAG IF IT DID NOT COOPERATE; EXPLOIT THE OPORTUNITY TO TRY TO WIN FIRM COMMITMENTS FROM THE PF AND THE FL TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN.

OPTION2: CONDEMNATION WITHOUT SANCTIONS BUT WITH CONTINUED PURSUIT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN AS OPPORTUNITIES ARISE. UNDER THIS OPTION WE WOULD STRESS THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SETTLEMENT; SUPPORT MODERATELY CONDEMNATORY BUT NON-OPERATIVE RESOLUTIONS IN THE UN; VETO NEW SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA IF PUSHED TO A VOTE; KEEP THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN ACTIVE WAITING FOR INDICATIONS THAT THE PF IS WILLING TO ACCEPT THE ESSENTIALS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN AND/OR A BREAKING DOWN OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR NEW INITIATIVES.

OPTION 3: WAIT AND SEE. UNDER THIS OPTION WE WOULD EXPRESS MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT BUT ESSENTIALLY TAKE A "WAIT AND SEE" POSTURE, IMPLYING PASSIVE ACQUIESCENCE IN THE MOVE; IN THE UN, VOTE AGAINST CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTIONS AND SANCTIONS; AND DE-ESCALATE BUT NOT ABANDON OUR PURSUIT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN.

12. OPTION 1 AT THIS TIME WOULD NOT SEEM REALISTIC. AS THE DEPARTMENT HAS INDICATED (STATE 0115), WE CANNOT AT PRESENT ACHIEVE WESTERN AGREEMENT TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO IMPOSE THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN ON SMITH EVEN IF THE PF SHOULD ACCEPT THE PLAN. IF AND WHEN THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, THE CONCEPT OF FORCING SMITH'S OUSTER BY MEANS OF CONFIDENTIAL

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PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA WILL BECOME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. THUS IT WOULD SEEM UNWISE, FOLLOWING THE INTERNAL MOVE, TO ACCELERATE OUR PURSUIT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN AND INCREASE EXPECTATIONS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO FOLLOW UP WITH NECESSARY MEASURES.

13. GIVEN OUR IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE OF RETAINING CREDIBILITY WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES AND NIGERIA, OPTION 3 IS CLEARLY UNDESIRABLE. WE CANNOT BE SEEN TO BE SIMPLY DROPPING THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN AND PASSIVELY ACQUIESCING IN SMITH'S MOVE. SUCH A POLICY WOULD NOT ONLY HURT US SERIOUSLY IN TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES, BUT WOULD GIVE SMITH GREAT ADVANTAGE IN HIS NEGOTIATION OF THE DETAILS AND MECHANICS OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. THE RESULT WOULD BE AN EMASCULATED MAJORITY RULE WHICH WE WOULD HAVE SEEMED TO ACCEPT.

14. THUS WE ARE LEFT WITH VARIATIONS OF THE MIDDLE, FLEXIBLE OPTION 2. THIS OPTION WOULD MAKE OUR DISAPPROVAL OF AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT CLEAR AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ITS INHERENT INSTABILITIES.

BY CONDEMNING THE NEW ARRANGEMENT BUT OPPOSING SANCTIONS AS PREMATURE, WE WOULD HOLD SMITH'S FEET TO THE FIRE AND ENCOURAGE A GENUINE TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE BLACK NATIONALISTS IN SALISBURY. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD COLLAPSE WITH A WALK-OUT BY MUZOREWA, WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PURSUE THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN. IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT THE PF AS A RESULT OF PRESSURE GENERATED BY THE AGREEMENT IN SALISBURY COULD ACCEPT THE ESSENTIALS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN. THIS, TOGETHER WITH STRONG FRONT LINE ENDORSEMENT, COULD POSSIBLY PROVIDE SUFFICIENT MOMENTUM TO GAIN THE NECESSARY AGREEMENT FOR SERIOUS PRESSURES AGAINST THE NEW SALISBURY REGIME AND ITS SUPPORTER, SOUTH AFRICA. A MUZOREWA DEFECTION WOULD ENHANCE THIS POSSIBILITY.

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15. IN ANY EVENT, UNDER OPTION 2 WE WOULD WANT TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO BRING ALL THE PARTIES TO A POLITICAL AGREEMENT. WE SHOULD DO THIS NOT ONLY BECAUSE UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS MIGHT MAKE AGREEMENT FEASIBLE, BUT ALSO TO RETAIN CREDIBILITY AND TO ALLOW A GRADUAL ADJUSTMENT IN OUR POSITION IF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT DEVELOPS IN DIRECTIONS WE CONSIDER FAVORABLE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL, HOWEVER, NOT TO MISLEAD THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES AS TO THE FINALITY OF OUR OPPOSITION TO THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT OR OUR ABILITY TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH NECESSARY MEASURES TO GET RID OF SMITH. BOWDLER.
UNQUOTE VANCE

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